"A Strong Leash for a Big Dog: Delegation of powers to check institutions in Brazil"
Brazil and South Korea have both recently undergone corruption scandals involving their corporate national champions and the political leaders of their countries. But that is where the similarities seem to end. In Brazil, an independent judiciary has been at the forefront of anti-corruption efforts, which have led to a longer, more public, and presumably more thorough set of trial-based reforms. In contrast, Korea's corruption scandals were quickly dealt with among a small core of economic and political elites and the judiciary has played a minor role in the reform process. In this talk, I consider why the experiences of Brazil and Korea diverge so profoundly. I argue that more than any international or other domestic factors, these varying responses to corruption are caused by judicial independence or the lack thereof; which is in turn contingent on the elite structures in each society. In Brazil, a fragmented and multiclass economic elite has pushed much more successfully for a strong separation of powers in the political sphere, which has enabled a strong and independent judiciary. In contrast, Korea is known to have a cohesive elite class that is focused on advancing a small set of economic interests. These elite patterns have conditioned the institutional structures, which in turn explains why Korea seems to have moved on so quickly whereas Brazil continues to be engaged in its scandals.
Brazil and South Korea have both recently undergone corruption scandals involving their corporate national champions and the political leaders of their countries. But that is where the similarities seem to end. In Brazil, an independent judiciary has been at the forefront of anti-corruption efforts, which have led to a longer, more public, and presumably more thorough set of trial-based reforms. In contrast, Korea's corruption scandals were quickly dealt with among a small core of economic and political elites and the judiciary has played a minor role in the reform process. In this talk, I consider why the experiences of Brazil and Korea diverge so profoundly. I argue that more than any international or other domestic factors, these varying responses to corruption are caused by judicial independence or the lack thereof; which is in turn contingent on the elite structures in each society. In Brazil, a fragmented and multiclass economic elite has pushed much more successfully for a strong separation of powers in the political sphere, which has enabled a strong and independent judiciary. In contrast, Korea is known to have a cohesive elite class that is focused on advancing a small set of economic interests. These elite patterns have conditioned the institutional structures, which in turn explains why Korea seems to have moved on so quickly whereas Brazil continues to be engaged in its scandals.