"Too Much Rule of Law?"
The Rule of Law is one of the fundamental checks on executive power that exist in a liberal democracy, alongside legislatures, federalism, bureaucracies, and free media. As such it is often regarded as an unmitigated good, but the fact is that all political systems need to balance constraints that moderate and legitimate power with the need for effective government. Democratic political systems differ with respect to the number of veto points provided by their constitutions, ranging from the Westminster system's "democratic dictatorship" to the highly complex system of checks and balances of the US system. While most developing democracies suffer from weak or missing judicial institutions, other countries suffer from excessive judicial checks that make decision-making extremely slow and costly. India and the United States would seem to be examples of the latter. Moreover, veto points can substitute for one another: courts for example often play quasi-legislative roles when legislatures fail to act, and vice-versa. There is probably an optimal number of judicial checks that resembles an inverted-U; where a country is on the curve will depend on how its judicial institutions interact with other veto players in the system.
The Rule of Law is one of the fundamental checks on executive power that exist in a liberal democracy, alongside legislatures, federalism, bureaucracies, and free media. As such it is often regarded as an unmitigated good, but the fact is that all political systems need to balance constraints that moderate and legitimate power with the need for effective government. Democratic political systems differ with respect to the number of veto points provided by their constitutions, ranging from the Westminster system's "democratic dictatorship" to the highly complex system of checks and balances of the US system. While most developing democracies suffer from weak or missing judicial institutions, other countries suffer from excessive judicial checks that make decision-making extremely slow and costly. India and the United States would seem to be examples of the latter. Moreover, veto points can substitute for one another: courts for example often play quasi-legislative roles when legislatures fail to act, and vice-versa. There is probably an optimal number of judicial checks that resembles an inverted-U; where a country is on the curve will depend on how its judicial institutions interact with other veto players in the system.